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M U C H  A D O  A B O U T  N O T H I N G
The Union Journal Sub-Committee, which met in February, decided to 
recommend to the Central Council, (a) that the journal be purchased outright 
by the Central Council and (b) that the control of the journal be vested in 
the Central Council on the understanding that the editors and staff carry 
on with the existing machinery, subject to their expressing such views as 
are compatible with the policy and desires of the Central Council.
The existing Journal Committee met the Sub-Committee and discussed 
the foregoing proposals, which were approved in principle.
The Executive Committee of the Central Council met later and decided 
to refer the full minutes of the discussion to the constituent bodies to enable 
them to give a mandate to their representatives at the next meeting of the 
Central Council.
Beading through the minutes, one cannot help feeling that much ado 
about nothing has been made of the whole issue.
At the same time, one cannot help being surprised at some of the state­
ments made by responsible members of the profession.
Attention was drawn at the outset to “ the valuable and profitable asset 
the Master Builders had in their journal, which was exceedingly popular, even 
amongst architects, because of the excellent reading matter in it.’ The 
Master Builders’ journal is essentially a trade journal, interleaved with 
advertisements, and although from time to time it contains articles of technical 
interest, it is doubtful whether the majority of our members would like our 
journal published on similar lines.
It was further mentioned that the “ Architect, Builder and Engineer 
was far more popular with architects in the Cape than the “ Record,” but this 
view does not appear to be shared by members elsewhere.
Stress was laid on the fact that the “ Record ” was merely an art journal, 
run for University art students.
This is a statement which requires elucidation, and we should like to 
know what is meant by the term “ University art students.” One frequently 
hears the word “ arty ” used by some of the older members of the profession, 
but we are at a loss to understand what is meant by such a word.
It is generally admitted that architecture is an art as well as a science, 
and comes under the category of the fine arts. In the finest periods of archi­
tecture the arts of architecture, painting and sculpture were closely allied.
The greatest architects of the past were practitioners in all three branches 
of art.
After a century or more of stagnation, architecture once again is coming 
into its own as a fine art and a closer relationship exists between it and its 
allied arts.
Is it not to our advantage, therefore, to stress these allied branches of 
art rather than to ignore them ?
Criticism was levelled at the make-up of the journal and the designs of 
the cover, which were described as “ of a jazzy nature ” and not in keeping 
with the dignity of an official professional journal.
The make-up of the journal has been favourably commented upon in the 
Press here and overseas, and the covers of the journal are quite in keeping 
with those of the leading architectural journals in other parts of the world. 
When illustrations are used on the cover they have been selected to indicate 
the nature of the contents. We doubt very much whether the profession 
would like us to revert to the type of cover adopted by the R.I.B.A. journal, as 
has been suggested, and thus lose our individuality altogether.
The criticism that some of the illustrations are not in the best of taste 
is too trivial to discuss. It must be remembered that the “ Record ” has been, 
in the main, a Transvaal journal, and members in the Transvaal have not
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taken exception to articles or illustrations. As a Central Council journal, 
it naturally follows that due consideration will be given to all shades of 
opinion.
It was suggested that the journal should publish more technical informa- 
tion, that it should reflect all shades of opinion within the Institute, and that 
it should hold the balance fairly as between the two contending' styles, modern 
and traditional.
We can fairly claim that this has been our policy for the past twelve 
years, as a glance at the files of the journal will prove. There has never 
yet been a bias in one particular direction.
As for matters of professional importance and professional interest not 
being attended to, as was stated, we can only ask for an explanation of such 
a statement.
It is quite obvious that the majority of our critics do not realise the 
amount of work entailed in the production of a monthly journal, nor are 
they aware of the fact that contributions are difficult to obtain in these busy 
times. The editors are frequently let down and have to rush round, at the 
eleventh hour, to collect matter from other journals or produce something 
themselves. This entails delay in the production and disorganisation in the 
printing of the journal.
The question of “control ’ figured largely in the discussions, and it is quite 
clear that some of the members wish to see that complete control in the matter 
of editorials, articles, illustrations and make-up is exercised by the Central 
Council.
We maintain that such a procedure is quite impossible, and, further, that 
the Central Council, while it may be composed of representatives of the 
constituent bodies, does not always represent the views of the majority of 
the members of those bodies. This has been proved time and again in the 
past. The only possible solution of this question of control was clearly 
indicated, in our opinion, by Mr. Furner, a former editor, who said : “ With 
regard to the principle they were discussing, every architectural journal was 
m some measure a work of art, and every editor must be given the right to 
exercise his discretion; if the work of the editors was interfered with, the 
result would be the production of a nondescript journal of value to nobody. 
It therefore seemed to him that the Central Council, in consultation with the 
constituent bodies, should appoint their editor, give their suggestions, and, 
during the period of his editorship, he should have the final say in the 
production and “ get-up ” of the journal. Apparently there was a fear that 
if the Central Council took over the journal, and made certain suggestions, 
the editors would resign. He thought that was assuming something that was 
not going to happen.” Mr. Furner further suggested, in order to bring the 
matter to a head, “ that the Central Council, at its next meeting, should decide 
whether or not it wanted to take over the journal, and if so, to indicate its 
views as to policy; the matter would then be referred to the Transvaal 
Provincial Institute, and, if it agreed, the editors should be appointed for a 
definite period, and during that period the editors should have complete 
control. He was definitely of opinion that the editors should not be subject 
to constant vetoes.”
What is required to make this journal an unqualified success, is the 
wholehearted support and co-operation of the profession. If that is forth­
coming our journal will become the profitable and valuable asset which some 
commercially-minded members desire, and at the same time we shall produce 
a journal which will be, as it should be from an architectural point of view a 
work of art.
A I T O N  C O U R T ,  J O H A N N E S B U R G
A Commentary by Ray Kantorowich.
An architect who attempts to solve an architectural problem within the 
limits of our present town-planning- arrangements finds at the outset that he 
is completely encircled by restrictions. It is impossible to design, say, a 
block of offices from absolute postulates as to the building’s functional and 
aesthetic requirements. The width of streets, the value of frontage, the 
size, shape and aspect of the site have such an extensive bearing upon the 
solution that a rather disappointing compromise is bound to result. Any 
contribution that a building may make to the city’s architecture must be 
within this ever-dominant compromise, and will show, broadly, a clearer 
understanding of the limitations imposed with an ability to circum­
vent them to a greater architectural degree than usual, and, in detail, a more 
subtle and resourceful handling of the small elements that combine to form 
the ensemble.
It is upon lines indicated above that the achievement of Aiton Court, a 
block of bachelor flats and rooms, will be discussed.
THE INTERIOR OF A FLAT IN THE BACK BLOCK OVERLOOKING THE COURTYARD
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• B e r n a r d  C o o k e
The site is a typical suburban one, 50ft. in frontage and 96ft. deep, facing 
north on to a quiet side street. The essence of the problem from the practical 
point of view was to give a northern aspect to each and every flat and to 
ensure that all would have northern sun for the major portion of the day.
The accommodation demanded was too large to enable the flats to be 
arranged in a single block across the stand, so that it was necessary to have 
a front and a back block. It is at this juncture that the radical departure 
from common Johannesburg flat practise was effected. It was found, after 
an elaborate set of calculations had been drafted, that should the front and 
back blocks be separated by an ample courtyard and the front block be kept 
low, sun would be able to strike down to the lowest flats of the back block.
A very interesting massing of the component elements results. The low 
front block, the tall rear block, the vertical circulation (lift and staircase) 
centrally placed on the west boundary of the site, with corridors running in 
either direction linking to each block.
The arrangement takes on added significance when one considers the 
character of the individual elements. The front block is raised completely 
off the ground by a series of columns. The ground floor consists only of the 
caretaker’s flat and the entrance, small elements set free in the general space. 
The front face of the block is much modulated by a play of recessed outer 
glass walls and projecting balconies, and the whole is capped by a curved 
solarium wall.
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T, back block, on the other hand, is severe and ruthless; a pure box 
with a e c^reen winc*ows over its one sur a^ce- Above, in similar severity,
are ^teseContrasting elements can only be reconciled by playing the effect 
„„ J , ,h  other of some third element; A and B, unrelated, having value rela- 
each other only by reference to C, a quantity related to each. This third 
is the staircase tower, which, in its thin, tall form, could have provided 
f;e“ eeffect ” pole to ordinate the other two units. However, by curving the 
“ rth face extremely delicately, the most powerful relationship is achieved 
This play of three dimensional form is an achievement that is almost 
unbelievable, when it is considered that it has occurred completely within 
\ he limits of an ordinary, internal Johannesburg site The most that one can 
Usually anticipate is some surface modulation with the possibility of a recess 
£f a few feet on the ground floor, as an indication or suggestion of three- 
dimensionality (e.g., Peter House, Bree Street). In this respect, if in no
other, Aiton Court is a building of note. , , . _  ..
Coming to the inside of the building, it may be useful to trace the 
study, commencing at the entrance. The level of the ground floor V? raised 
, i  few feet in order that the basement, used for parking cars, may be lit. The 
' result is that a new fresh plane is established in the building at once removed 
from the street. One has passed from the public circulation to the more 
restricted circulation of the flat dwellers. A very formal flight of steps 
indicates precisely and firmly where the transition occurs.
THE FRONT BLOCK AND THE STAIRCASE TOWER
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Once on the new plane, a fine sense of spaciousness is felt. A rigid beat 
of columns is not broken either by the caretaker’s flat, which is set freely 
within the area and is coloured a light buff, or by the glass screen that 
defines the further enclosure of the entrance hall. The transition from open 
street to the innermost portions of the entrance hall is extremely subtle; 
firstly, a roof is the only enclosure; then one has complete enclosure only 
defined by the delicate glass screen; this is in effect only a transitory experi­
ence before the ultimate limitation of solid surfaces around the lift-well is 
felt.
The treatment of the various surfaces in this “ loggia ” is such that either 
one filters through under the low slab and into the great tall space of the 
garden or one proceeds directly to the lift. This effect of a duality of 
direction given by the loggia is achieved, on the one hand, by the rake of 
the side wall of the caretaker’s fiat, the glass wall and the open floor space, 
and, on the other hand, by the strong green colour and rough texture of the 
west wall, with the play of the pivotted wine-coloured door against it. 
Generally one may say that the loggia fulfils its dynamic and directional 
purposes admirably.
The entrance hall proper does not succeed quite to the same degree. It 
has been spoilt mainly by the colouring employed. A strong plane at right 
angles to the green leading-in wall seems necessary to define the end of the 
forward movement and change the direction into the lift well and, as the 
green darkens as one proceeds further in, one feels that a brilliantly light 
surface is necessary for the purpose. The end wall, however, is coloured in 
a very dead grey which gives a dullness to that part of the building quite 
out of keeping with the general sparkling character of the remainder.
The courtyard itself is a really delightful piece of planning. It manages 
somehow to avoid the artificial paved look to which one is usually accustomed. 
This is due to several factors. Firstly, sun pours into the space, giving it 
a definitely cheery aspect quite different from the soil-pipe ridden, bleak, red 
grano courtyards that one usually finds in city flats. Further, the client, 
with much foresight, has filled flower boxes and fishpond with vegetation, 
so that the flat dwellers have a garden, although common to all, which 
they may rest their eyes upon. The success of the courtyard is amply proved 
by the fact that the back flats, looking on to the courtyard, “ sold ” much 
sooner than the front ones, which look on to the public street.
The living cells are of two types—one-roomed flats and single furnished 
rooms. The flats are simple in design, consisting of a formal entrance hall 
which leads to the bathroom and a large living room, in which is planned the 
kitchenette portion, separated by fittings and curtain. The form of the 
fittings and the kitchenette they enclose, appear slightly arbitrary and heavy 
in the main volume. One, however, is unable to say how the arrangement could 
be improved. Keeping the fittings lower would certainly have lightened the 
character, but would have allowed a rather large proportion of cooking odour 
to permeate the living room. A generous sweep of window across the north 
wall floods the flats with light and somehow gives the impression that the room 
is much larger than it really is. Disconcerting alternations of dark and light 
patches at the window wall (and their consequent feeling of prison-bar 
oppressiveness), caused by small areas of walling separating isolated window 
units, are avoided, by carrying the windows right across from one lateral 
surface to the other.
Detail treatment within the room is nicely handled, and one can mention 
particularly the skilful handling of usually clumsy concrete construction, and 
also a neat fireplace and bookshelf fitting.
The single rooms occupy the upper floors of the back block, and here 
there is a difficulty that has not been satisfactorily overcome. In the width, 
below are three flats and directly above, four rooms. The architects have 
compromised in this awkward 3:4 relationship by carrying the structural 
framework up and varying the window treatment. One feels that a more 
organic expression of two entirely different elements might have been 
achieved. This, however, would necessarily be at the expense of the very 
pure forms of the back block mentioned before.
The exterior handling of the building is good. Its success relies mainly 
in the handling of window units. The regular squaring over the back block, 
the small squares on the soaring staircase window, and the alternate flush 
and recessed units of the front block, are three window treatments calculated 
to accentuate the relationship between the forms on which they occur.
The frames of all the north windows of the flats and rooms are picked 
out in a deep terra-cotta colour., while the lower solid panels are steel blue.
There is one element which one finds worrying. This is the solarium, 
which is rather limp and formless in shape, and is, furthermore, pierced 
rudely by an opening along its slowly curving surface. More disturbing still 
is the fact that this essentially two-dimensional screen is picked out in a pale 
green exactly similar to that which colours a very cubic and three-dimen­
sional boys’ room on the roof. The relationship between the two units that 
is obviously implied is not apparent.
For the rest, one can only say that the building is refreshingly clean, 
vigorous and colourful. The treatment throughout is purposeful and succeeds 
meritoriously in evoking the well calculated response from the onlooker. 
Any criticisms that have been made are only on the hig'her architectural 
planes and take effect only after one has realised the achievements of the 
building which lift it quite out of the ordinary run. Criticism takes place 
only after one has assigned to Aiton Court the position of being one of the few 
Johannesburg buildings of any architectural merit at all, for which fact one 
must congratulate the architects, who have produced a building of archi­
tectural beauty, and also, very definitely, the client, who was broad-minded 
enough to allow such a proposition as a building of this civic value ever to 
be built.
O P P O S I T E :  F A C A D E  D E T A I L  • P h o t o :  K a n t o r o w i c h
112

T H E  N E W  P O W E R  S T A T I O N  A N D  I T S  C H I M N E Y
T H E N E W  P O W E R  S T A T I O N , C A P E T O W N
The Municipality of Capetown seems determined to destroy the beauties 
of the wonderful site provided by nature as a setting for its city.
In an earlier article, referring to the foreshore scheme, we pointed out 
how the new Power Station would effectively block the streets to the west 
of Adderley Street.
This has now been achieved, and the City Fathers are priding them­
selves on having erected the tallest chimney in Africa. The engineer has 
again won the day. Not only has the superb silhouette of Table Mountain 
been destroyed by the erection of a cable station at the top, but the view 
of the mountain from the docks has been permanently ruined by this recently 
erected structure.
Not that we object to the design of the chimney. It is essentially func­
tional and we would prefer to see it as it is rather than clothe it in the 
trappings of some bybone period of architecture, as so often happens.
But why put it just there ? Surely some site could have been found, 
further east, and in close proximity to the railway and industrial areas.
Presumably the coal required will have to be hauled across the main 
street of the city.
A recent visitor from overseas is said to have remarked when viewing 
the chimney from the deck of the mail boat : And they plank it between 
us and one of the finest views in Africa—or anywhere else in the world. Is 
there no way of getting' the public out here to stop things like that ?
That is the crux of the whole problem. How are we going to stop such 
vandalism unless the Government follows the lead of other countries and sets 
up a Fine Arts Commission? We in Johannesburg, an essentially materialistic 
and industrial community, lacking the amenities of our coastal cities, are not 
surprised when things like this happen in our midst, but we have a right to 
protest when such sites as that of Capetown, the mother city, the centre of 
culture, and the seat of Government, are slowly being destroyed through 
apathy on the part of the public. What can one, then, expect from communi­
ties in the back veld, when their representatives in Parliament are being 
educated in this way ?
We may yet live to see the day when the cliff-like face of Table Mountain 
is used for election posters or trade advertisements.
G.E.P.
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1. Protection nil.
2. Against E : relative; against Ex ; nil; against I :  absolute.
3. Against E : relative; against Ei : nil; against I ; absolute.
4. Protection against E Et I : absolute.
1910 <955
COMPARATIVE DESTRUCTIVE FORCE OF 
AIRCRAFT 1918-1935.
With acknowledgments to
RELATIVE ACCURACY OF INCEN­
DIARY BOMBING.
100 projectiles released from an altitude 
of 2,000 metres.
Aujourd ’Hui. December, 1937.UArchitecture D’
AN INVESTIGATION INTO WAYS AND MEANS OF RENDERING BUILDINGS, 
BOTH DOMESTIC AND COMMERCIAL, PROOF AGAINST BOMBING AND GAS 
ATTACKS WITHIN PRACTICAL LIMITS, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO LOCAL 
CONDITIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA.
A THESIS BY MARK G. HUSSEY •  UNIVERSITY OF CAPETOWN
PART ONE.
PRELIMINARY REMARKS.
The consideration of the proofing of buildings against gas and bomb attacks in such 
a way that it is an integral part of the construction, is a matter requiring the urgent and 
immediate attention of all those in any way connected with the architectural profession.
I t remains an undisputed fact that wholesale bombing and gassing of the civilian 
population with a view to terrorising nations into submission is now an established policy 
of war. This is especially so in the case where the nature of the country would render 
a war long and expensive : for recent reference one has only to glance at the conquest of 
Abbysinia, in which matters were speeded up by the flagrant use of gas, the wholesale 
massacre of noncombatants in the Basque Area in Spain a.nd the recent shocking bombing 
of civilians in China.
In a country of such rough terrain and one so extensive as South Africa, a war of 
conquest would entail perhaps years of guerilla warfare for the attacking forces, the 
final issue remaining possibly in doubt for a considerable time. This is not to be considered 
in modern warfare, particularly in the methods adopted by the Governments of “dictator ” 
countries, to whom a speedy, smashing and sensational victory is essential.
This very definitely entails the bombing of the capitals or principal towns either to 
paralyse the administration or reduce the people to a state of terrified submission. The 
protection offered to citizens from such bombing and gassing will prove a vital point in the 
success or failure of such demoralising raids.
At present the principal attempts made at offering such protection in other countries 
have been the provision of gas masks, preparation for the establishment of treatment 
centres for casualties, and arrangements for the decontamination of buildings after 
attack In two countries only have attempts been made to provide protection by means of 
large scale gas proof shelters. The focal point of present defence policy is the efficiency 
of the gas masks and the pre-supposition that the supply of respirators is adequate and 
efficiently controlled. I t  is this very essential point that is the subject of the hottest 
contention among those best qualified to give an opinion on the matter.
Opinions vary from the rather far-fetched statement that the British Government has 
produced a mask capable of giving absolute protection against any known gas that could 
at present be used in warfare to the recently published press statement by Dr. Stone that 
the present gas mask is “ practically useless.” He stated “ The British Government must 
have known that the gas protection instructions which they have issued are almost futile. 
The reason why this fact was not admitted and why the results of the Government tests 
were never disclosed is that they wish to avoid panic.” Such a statement by an authority 
like Dr. Stone behoves our considering at the outset whether gas protection should be 
dependent on masks, or whether complete protection by means of gas and bomb proof 
rooms under conditions of comparative safety and comfort should be provided.
At the outset it must be realised that although gas-masks are produced by various 
private firms in collaboration with the British Government (see Appendix 1), specialists 
in the work and extensive experiments and tests have proved that absolute reliance cannot 
be placed on respirators of even the most advanced type.
I t must be borne in mind that of the 216 generally known gases, there are at least 
eight against which no known respirator is at present effective (see Appendix 2). Even 
in those cases in which masks are noted as providing complete protection, the manufacturers 
specifically state that should the masks be in any way damaged, or even old (their
deterioration is rapid unless the greatest care is taken of them) the effectiveness cannot
be in any way guaranteed and the protection is only partial. This in itself is an extremely 
disconcerting fact. Further to this, however, there are known gases which penetrate or 
partially destroy rubber, glass and metal. If  such gases are used in combination with 
other non-penetrative but lethal gases, the corroding effects of the penetrative gas will
eventually admit the lethal gases and render the mask only partially effective, if not
altogether useless. The writer has been through a respirator test in a test-tank filled 
with Tear Gas and wearing the official civilian respirator. The amount of gas the mask 
admitted was sufficient to induce sickness after ten minutes exposure, while the sensation 
of choking was almost unbearable.. There are several gases which are made up with 
the express purposes of inducing panic, and excessive coughing and choking. The smallest 
amount of such gases penetrating the mask cause the victim to tear if off.
I t  is necessary, therefore, from the above brief investigations and from statements 
made by members of the Air Raids Precautions Department to the writer in London, that, 
if in any way possible, some effective means for complete isolation from the gas in the 
actual buildings normally occupied must be obtained to provide safety from the non- 
combatants till danger is passed and the streets and properties be declared free from 
contamination,
The general method of attack on a city is briefly this :—The attacking forces despatch 
bombing planes which attempt to break the windows and crack the walls of buildings with 
explosive bombs. Gas bombs coupled with explosive and incendiary bombs are then 
dropped to spread the gas into the partially destroyed buildings, and destroy the buildings 
still further. The writer visited a number of buildings in England during the past year 
which had been prepared by the Air Raids Precautions Department as giving adequate 
protection against gas attacks, and it is his firm opinion that the protection they offered 
was only partially effective, for reasons stated later.
The present outlined scheme adopted in England is shown on the accompanying 
drawings.
I t is the intention, therefore, of this Thesis to investigate the possibility of rendering 
buildings proof as far as possible, in the first place, against damage from aerial bombard­
ment by explosive and incendiary bombs; once this protection is offered, to then render 
these buildings or a part of the building safe against gas, using the gas mask as a last 
resort only. The subject, therefore, divides itself into the following sections: —
1. BOMBPROOFING :
(a) Incendiary bombs : Protection from direct effects thereof, isolation of buildings
struck, treatment for fireproofing of buildings.
(b) Explosive bombs : Investigation as to the possibility of the protection of
buildings against oblique hits, concussive effects due to
distant hits, etc.
(c) Aerial torpedoes : Protection against distant hits, and concussive effects further
to the last paragraph.
2. General considerations of the protection of buildings outside the province of the above
parts. (These investigations cover both commercial and domestic dwellings.)
3. GASPROOFING :
In general, an investigation into the effect of the various types of gases likely 
to be met with will be considered in an appendix, the effects of such gases on 
buildings and building materials only being considered, and the possibility of 
protection against damage.
4. The consideration of individual shelters : comprising :•—Air space required, time limits
for isolation protection of contamination by persons entering, protection against 
collapse by outside concussive forces, and the final decontamination of buildings 
after the gases have dispersed.
5. The construction of shelter in buildings employing large numbers of workmen who
require immediate protection on the spot. In this connection it will be necessary 
to investigate some means of immediate decontamination of all essential services 
which require a minimum time of stoppage and for which immediate occupation 
as soon as possible after attack is essential.
6. Decontamination of buildings, areas and building materials : This most essentia]
service must be rendered before the populace can use the streets or emerge from 
their bomb and gas proof shelters.
The Thesis is, therefore, divided into the above six headings, Appendices being given 
at the end, containing detailed information for reference purposes,
SECTION ONE : PROTECTION AGAINST BOMBING.
INCENDIARY BOMBS.
The incendiary bomb is probably the only bomb for which any degree of protection 
can be given against a direct hit. I t  is briefly a bomb which contains in itself both a 
highly inflammable substance and the necessary oxygen producing components for its 
explosive combustion : that is, the bomb upon exploding is not dependent upon the 
atmosphere for its burning, and, therefore, literally cannot be put out. Water only increases 
its rate of combustion—to such a dangerous degree that an explosion may ensue ; sand does 
not smother it, if completely covered with earth it  is merely “ choked ” and the flames 
will spurt up out of the soil. The only form of protection, therefore, is to isolate it in 
such a way that it may burn itself out, affecting the surrounding building as little as 
possible. This form of protection must of necessity be an integral part of the building 
construction, as existing roofs cannot be suddenly made bomb and fire proof.
The British Government handbook advises the laying of earth over the top floor surface 
of the building. This is not greatly practical as the earth would be free to pour through 
any cracks or holes, and would definitely fail to be a certain safeguard were portions of 
the floor to crack and fall away due to the excessive heat generated by the bomb.
An insulator from this heat is required in addition to this sand layer, as the amount 
of heat given out from the incendiary bomb, whether covered by sand or not, will crack 
six inch concrete after seven minutes exposure. The Air Raids Precautions Department 
suggests the use of a long handled scoop to remove the burning bomb from its position. As 
the bomb cannot be approached without special protective clothing, owing to the intense 
heat, even presuming that it was accessible, and presuming further that the persons present 
were cool and collected, its removal appears to be a matter of the greatest difficulty, if 
not almost impossible.
A SUGGESTED ADAPTION OF THE ABOVE FOR INSULATED 
PROTECTIO N  FROM  IN CEN D IA RY-BO M b F IR ES
SYSTEM  OF HEAT INSULATION ADOPTED IN REFRIGERATION 
EN G IN EER IN G  IN UN IVERSAL MODERN P R A C T IC E
I t becomes imperative that some means of insulated protection he provided as part 
and parcel of the roof construction itself.
The construction at present adopted by cold storage plants throughout the world for 
insulating chill rooms from outside heat lends itself admirably to adaption.
The system adopted in this country and America in latest practice is as follows :— 
Upon the top of the 5 inch concrete slab which forms the floor/ceiling, there is placed 
a layer of 8 inch slab cork. The 5 inch slab is reinforced to stand the weight of the 
floor (generally about |  inch dia. steel at 6 inch centres). On top of this is placed another 
layer of 3 inch concrete, lightly reinforced ( |  inch dia. at 18 inch centres). This provides a 
firm and completely insulated ceiling/floor through which there are no losses of heat. (Only 
approximately one British Thermal Unit per sq. ft. per day). The heat given out by 
an incendiary bomb is, of course, very great, but if “ choked ” by a sand layer, only 100 
B.T.U.’s per minute per square foot penetrate downwards.
I t would appear, therefore, that if the system adopted by refrigeration experts were 
expanded and adapted as follows, a reasonable degree of protection against direct incendiary 
bomb hits might be obtained
One such adapted protective floor per house (or for one room per house), should 
suffice. The construction is as follows :—Commence the protective floor with a 6 inch 
layer of concrete, adequately reinforced, say with f  inch bars at 5 inch centres. This 
would stand the shock of an incendiary bomb of 5 litre falling from 300 feet, as a direct 
hit.
(Note.—There is no downward explosive force of any great amount to be considered. 
The actual force of any 5 litre bomb falling that distance is calculated thus : A 5 litre bomb 
has capacity of 9 pints at approximately 1.12 lbs. per pint—say 10 lbs. falling 300 ft. 
with no initial velocity downwards other than the accumulating momentum. The Kinetic 
energy after falling 300 ft. a t 32 ft. per section would be : wv2/6i.4 i.e. 10 x 3,000 
(average velocity-) i.e. 30,000/64.4 says 500 lbs. Taking its force of blow on the 
protective floor as double this amount, say 1,000 lbs., the 6 inch slab reinforced as above 
will amply suffice).
Having this protective floor which prevents the bomb penetrating to the room beneath, 
we have to insulate the slab from the excessive heat generated by the bomb. Adapting the 
cold storage method but using 8 inch of granulated asbestos in place of the cork, we have 
an insulating figure of about 150 B.T.U.’s per minute (downwards). This will amply 
insulate a 5 litre incendiary bomb, IF DAMPED. About 1 ft. 0 inches of dry earth would 
adequately “ damp ” such a bomb, provided as little air as possible reached it. This 
damping can be achieved by a 1 ft. 0 inch layer of sand covered by a 3 inch slab of 
reinforced concrete, as illustrated. This gives a 3 inch protective slab, which would break 
the force of, although it would be penetrated by, an incendiary bomb. Once through this 
the bomb would commence to burn, but it would be in the layer of sand, thus being 
sufficiently “ damped ” to prevent the heat being too great for the insulating asbestos ; 
the asbestos in turn preventing the heat being too great for the 6 inch concrete. A 
reasonably certain degree of protection would thus be obtained.
I t must, of course, be realised that in practice the effect of the bomb might differ 
from the above theoretical supposition, but the margin of safety allowed in the con­
struction shown is sufficient to provide for all but quite exceptional circumstances, as far 
as can possibly be foreseen without actual experiment.
The structure thus protected would naturally be best served by a flat roof, with the 
top layer drained off to a fall as illustrated.
Consideration as to whether this is within the bounds of possibility as regards expense, 
is gone into in Appendix 3.
The matter does not rest here, however. The purely explosively destructive bomb has 
to be next considered and protection provided—as far as possible—against this.
HIGH EXPLOSIVE BOMBS.
High explosive bombs may be expected to weigh anything from 250 to 3,000 pounds. 
The higher weights are not likely to be used in normal bombing activities, as their use is 
generally confined to attack on a fixed objective, and only one 3,000 lb. bomb is loaded on 
each major bomber. The medium weight bomb—of 500 lbs.—is the one most likely to be 
encountered.
These bombs can be designed to burst on contact with a hard surface, or to penetrate 
a considerable distance before bursting. The latter type of bomb would penetrate an 
ordinary building before exploding, though contact with a steel or stone structure might 
serve to deflect the path of the bomb or to explode it prematurely : reinforced concrete 
of exceptional thickness might cause the bomb to explode before penetration.
It has to be regrettably acknowledged, however, that there is no practical means of 
protection against a direct hit from a modern high-explosive bomb. To attain any certain 
degree of protection requires a 35 ft. depth of solid concrete, or a 100 ft. depth of earth 
(these figures being given by the Air Raids Precautions Department). Such construction is 
impossible of general attainment.
Direct hits, however, only cause a very small proportion of the damage done. Damage 
is mainly brought about by the blast of the explosion and by fragmentation of the shell 
of the bomb which results.
Regarding direct hits, therefore, as regrettably unavoidable casualties which reluctantly 
have to be faced, we have to consider the protection of buildings in the immediate vicinity 
of an exploding bomb—that is, we have to guard against the damage done by 5001b. 
bombs which explode not less than 50 feet away. The following thicknesses of materials 
will afford protection from the blast and splinters of such an explosion :
MATERIAL. THICKNESS. REMARKS.
Mild steel plate ..................  14 ins.
Stock bricks in cement 15J ins. hollow
mortar .................... 134 ins. solid
Unreinforced concrete not
weaker than 6-1 ...  15 ins.
Reinforced concreete ...  12 ins.
Reinforced concrete ...  10 ins.
Sand or earth or coal dust
revetments ..................  2 ft. 6 ins.
Coal (lumps) ..................  2 ft. 6 ins.
Shingle (or ballast revet­
ments between wood 
or C.G.I. sheeting) ...  2 ft. 0 ins.
Shingle revetments con­
tained between steel 
plates. Front plate } 
in. and back plate i  
in. in thickness ...  10 ins.
Special steels give a greater resistance.
2 ins. cavity to be open.
Normal structural concrete.
Normal reinforcement.
Specially reinforced to stand the punch­
ing shear effect of splinters which 
induces tensile stresses between the 
front and rear faces of the concrete 
wall. Rectangular links (connecting 
front and back reinforcement) of l 
in. dia. rods at 12 ins. centres is a 
suggested arrangement which has been 
tested successfully.
This should be the minimum thickness, 
for example, at the top of a traverse 
or revetment.
A sandwich of shingle between sheeting.
Taken from the A.R.P.D. official instructions.
From these tables it would appear that if the outside walls be 14 inches thick, this 
will provide reasonable protection from bomb explosions within not less than 50 feet. 
Two nine inch walls with a two in. cavity would give certain protection from the splinters, 
concussive effects and flying debris of bombs of larger calibre. As these concussive forces 
generally act from the ground, the roof construction is not affected, and requires no further 
modification from the previously considered roofing arrangement for incendiary bombs.
Protection must be considered, however, for the wall openings—windows, doors, air 
vents, etc. Protection for both windows and doors can be obtained by the use of steel 
shutters hung so as to close outside, after the fashion of ordinary shutters, but with inside 
fastening. These should be of 1-| inch mild steel plate and must lap 3 inch round the 
window opening. A little thought in design could make attractive features of these 
shutters.
The system advocated by the Air Raids Precautions Department is the banking of 
doors by an outside wall of sandbags or sand-boxes as follows : —
The sandbags are banked from 4 ft. 6 inch at the base to 2 ft. 0 inch minimum at the 
top, bonding them as can best be achieved by the changing of the bags, end-on or side-on, 
leaving a 2 ft. 0 inch wide access to the door.
While attaining its purpose, this method still allows of concussive effects reaching 
the door, and is only a protection against splinters and debris. There is an added danger 
that the door may be blocked by an explosion forcing the sandbags against it.
Such a construction could not remain permanently in front of the entrance during 
peace time, and it would be extremely difficult to arrange the protection in haste in the 
event of a sudden raid.
It is, therefore, desirable that the door protection be part of the door construction 
itself, functioning as a normal door during peace time, but forming a perfectly adequate 
protection against concussion and splinters during air raids. This could be admirably 
achieved by having a laminated steel door, using 1J inch mild steel plate as the centre 
reinforcement. I t  will be noted that this door should be arranged so as to fit with a 
3 inch lap over the outside of the door opening (as for the windows, with inside fastening) 
otherwise it will be blown into the room as a solid block by any bomb bursting near it.
Suitable care in design would make these doors an attractive feature of the building 
or room concerned.
AERIAL TORPEDOES.
As regards aerial torpedoes, the same conditions apply as for the heavier weights of 
explosive bombs. They are used for a definite objective, such as ammunition works, 
administrative centres, etc., and would not apply to civilian or “ terrorist ” bombing. In 
any event, such torpedoes have such terrific explosive power that it is not practicable to 
attempt any method of defence for the general public. Direct hits would simply have to 
be unavoidable casualties.
As regards defence against the damage due to concussive forces, splinters and flying 
debris, the previously considered precautions would again be effective, except that the 
range of “ direct hit ” would not be limited to a radius of 50 feet. One hundred and 
thirty feet would have to be regarded as the effective extent to be considered as a direct 
hit.
We thus have a possible means of providing reasonable security, within practical 
limits, against incendiary bombs, explosive bombs of medium weight (other than direct 
hits), the concussive effects of the larger weight bombs and aerial torpedoes.
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GENERAL PRECAUTIONS THAT WILL ASSIST.
As the explosive and incendiary bombs penetrate considerably before exploding, the 
effects of non-direct hits will be substantially reduced if the bomb falls into soft ground. 
I t  is thus advisable that buildings, as far as possible, be surrounded with an area of well 
ploughed land, normal flower gardens (if kept well turned), or cultivated ground. Note.—- 
Lawns and gravel stretches are not advised.
All known weaknesses in the buildings being prepared for bomb-proofing should be 
attended to, such as large window surfaces, drain outlets, ventilators, etc.—in short, any 
surface which would be blown in by the concussive effects of a bomb explosion must be 
eliminated or protected.
The writer’s reason for having dealt with this matter before investigating the far 
more important subject of protection against gas attacks is this : Although bombing by 
explosive bombs will only cause a small percentage of the damage compared with the 
deaths which will result from gas bombing, it is an essential prelude to the actual use of 
gas. The buildings affected by explosive bombs will be damaged in some way or other 
(that is, the buildings not specifically designed and adapted to withstand such concussion). 
This damage will nullify all attempts at gas-proofing which may have been made, and 
render the so-called gas-proof rooms death traps.
I t was particularly impressed on the writer’s mind when having interviews with 
various members of the British Air Raids Precautions Department in London, and when 
visiting “ proofed ” rooms and dug-outs, that the proofing against gas which had been 
undertaken or advised, almost completely disregarded the essential fact that the smallest 
concussive shocks would render such precautions useless, or very ineffective.
The official instructions issued by the British Government will, therefore, be first 
considered, the essential points of weakness eliminated and an attempt made to improve 
upon them.
SECTION THREE : GAS PROOFING.
EXISTING BUILDINGS.
The effects of the various types of gas likely to be encountered under local conditions 
is contained in Appendix 4, where it deals with the effect of the gases on building com­
ponents. I t  is only necessary to refer to this appendix at suitable points.
In dealing with the protection of existing buildings, it will be evident that this must 
form the major part of any gas defence scheme at present, as it will probably be many 
years before any radical attempt is made at the actual construction of gas and bomb­
proof buildings.
Gas attacks may be made by means of bombs or spray. If the former are used, 
the gas will be liberated where the bomb explodes, whereas the gas discharged by spray 
will descend in the form of a fine shower of liquid, which may travel with the wind some 
distance before reaching the ground.
The weight of a gas bomb varies, and it may be anything up to 250 lbs. or even larger. 
The poison gas content would normally account for more than half the weight of the bomb.
Gases may be divided into two main types (i) non-persistent and (ii) persistent.
Non-persistent gases when liberated are rapidly diluted by admixture with the air, 
and the period for which they continue to be dangerous is dependent upon the atmospheric 
conditions. Examples of such gases are chlorine, phosgene, and the poisonous smokes 
derived from various arsenical compounds.
Persistent gases (for example, mustard gas) usually consist of a contaminating liquid 
which will continue to give off poisonous vapour for many hours or even weeks, unless 
counter-measures are taken.
In providing protective measures against air attack, the object is to prevent the gas, 
in liquid or vapour form, from penetrating into the building or shelter which it is desired 
to protect; and this is achieved by making the shelter air-tight.
The following extract is taken from the British Government official instructions 
(Handbook No. 6, “ Precautions in Factories and Business Premises ” p. 7).
“ Air attacks can be delivered with great suddenness and it would be impossible to 
improvise the necessary precautionary measures at short notice. I t  is essential that a
survey or the various measures to be adopted should be made at the present time, and 
that all necessary preliminary arrangements should be made to enable these measures to 
be put into force without delay.”
In each house a room or rooms should he prepared to prevent the entry of gas, sb 
that it may he safely occupied during a raid in which gas is used. The room to he 
protected should, therefore, he selected on the following principles :—
(1) A cellar or basement is hest, always provided that there is no risk or flooding and 
that alternative means of exit exist.
(2) If there is no basement, choose a room on the ground floor.
(3) The windows of the rooms should he small and if possible not in an exposed 
position. If they face soft ground, the blast of an exploding bomb will be more smothered 
than if they face a paved or metallic surface. The glass will in any case be liable to be 
broken by the explosion of high explosive bombs, even at a considerable distance, and 
some other covering will have to be fastened over the window frame.
(4) Where possible, the room should be on the side of the house least exposed to 
the prevailing wind. Wind pressure will assist the entry of gas through small crevices and 
ill-fitting window frames.
(5) The entry of gas into a house is always assisted by draughts, so it is important 
to shut all doors and windows throughout the house before withdrawing to the gas-protected 
room.
(6) Apply the general gas-protection instructions to the whole house so far as 
possible, after paying special attention to the selected room. If  the penetration of gas 
into the house is reduced to a minimum, the occupants of the protected room will be all 
the safer, and a great deal of trouble will be avoided because the house will not subse­
quently need decontaminating to the same extent as if the gas had penetrated freely into 
the interior.
The number of people who can safely remain in unventilated rooms for any prolonged 
period is naturally limited. If a room contains too many people, the first trouble will 
not be shortage of oxygen or increase of carbon dioxide, but intolerable discomfort due 
to rise in temperature and humidity of the air. The capacity of a room is therefore to 
be measured, not by its cubic content of air, but by the surface area available for the 
removal of heat and the condensation of moisture.
Under local summer conditions, closed rooms may safely be occupied for periods up 
to six hours if the surface area of the walls, floor and ceiling is equivalent to an allowance 
of 100 sq. ft. per person. The following are examples of how this formula works out in 
typical rooms.
Permissible
SELECTION OF ROOMS IN  EX ISTIN G  BUILDINGS.
Size of Room. Occupants.
10 ft. x 10 ft. x 8 f t ........................................................................   5
15 ft. x 10 ft. x 8 f t .................................................................................... 7
20 ft. x 15 ft. x 10 f t ...................................................................................  13
30 ft. x 15 ft. x 12 ft. .........................................................................  20
Note that these calculations are NOT based on cubic capacity, which would give 
different figures.
The rendering of rooms gas-proof is simplified if a quick survey is taken of all points 
at which gas might be admitted. The accompanying illustration gives typical structural 
defects against which remedial measures must be taken. The object is to seal up all 
cracks and crevices through which gas may find entrance to the room, and to provide a 
gas-proof means of exit and entrance.
PO SSIBLE DEFECTS IN NORMAL EX IST . BUILD INGS ADMITTING GAS 
WITH SU G G ESTED  METHODS OF REM ED YIN G C A U SES  OF LEA KA G E
AIR LOCK AT ENTRANCE.
At the regular entrance to the shelter an air lock should he constructed, being a 
compartment with a door to the outside and a door to the shelter through which a 
person entering the shelter must pass. By having one or other or these doors always 
closed, the direct passage of air from the outside into the shelter can be prevented.
One method of constructing an air lock is to set up two blanket screens across the 
entrance passage, so that a person can enter the space between the screens and adjust 
the fitting of the blankets before passing into the shelter. The screens should be at least 
4ft. apart, and preferably anything up to 10ft. apart in a shelter accommodating a large 
number.
When curtains alone are used at the ends of an air lock, they should rest on a 
framework inclined some 20 degrees from the vertical, so that the curtain will lie close 
on the frame. Laths should also be nailed to the curtain at about one foot intervals, to 
keep the curtain stretched across the opening. If  laths are put on both sides (as is 
desirable), those on the under side should be short enough to lie between the sides of 
the frame, and those on the upper side should be long enough to rest across the frame. 
When not in use, the curtain can be rolled upwards and tied to the top of the frame. The 
curtain can be made of oilskin, or blanket, or canvas, or any other close-woven material. 
If not itself gas-proof, it should be kept wet, preferably with a solution of chloride of 
lime, though this is not essential.
I f  there is a door to the shelter, it can serve in place of one of the blanket screens, 
provided that it is made air-tight. This can be done by making the door draughtproof 
with felt or rubber. All keyholes and other cracks should of course be stopped up. 
Alternatively, two air-tight doors can serve as an entrance and exit to an air lock.
An air lock is used in the following way. Anyone wishing to get into or out of the 
protected part of the building opens the door or curtain to get into the air lock, and then 
shuts that door or curtain before opening the one at the other end of the air lock. Each 
door should always be opened gently and no wider than is necessary.
The air lock must be large enough to hold all the people who need to pass through 
it at one time, and should have a margin of size to guard against the risk of the further 
door or curtain being pushed open before the first is closed. Thus the entrance to a 
building accommodating many people, or to a public shelter, will need a larger air lock 
than the entrance to a private house. In no case should the space between the two doors 
or curtains be less than four feet. Where stretchers have to be carried through, the air 
lock should be 10 feet long.
On general grounds, the larger an air lock is the better. I t  is obvious that, every 
time the outer door or curtain is opened, a little gas may get into the air lock. The 
atmosphere in the air lock will gradually get to contain a low concentration of gas, and 
this will tend to enter the protected part of the building as the inner door or curtain is 
opened. If, however, the air lock itself is large, the large volume of air which it contains 
will reduce the concentration of gas derived from the small amounts which enter the outer 
door or curtain, and the concentration which can penetrate into the protected part of 
the building will be correspondingly kept low. Therefore, where the space is available, 
it  is better to devote a whole room to form an air lock rather than to build a compartment 
which is only just large enough for the purpose.
WINDOWS.
The object of maintaining intact the glass or a substitute for glass in a window 
opening is, besides keeping out the effects of weather, etc., to prevent poison-laden air 
entering the room or shelter.
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NOTE.
The air pressure or blast due to the explosion of a high explosive bomb bursting 
some distance from a window composed of the ordinary type of glass shatters the glass 
and projects the broken pieces with considerable velocity into the building.
Protection from the effect of blast from a bomb bursting some distance away can 
be given to glass windows by constructing on the outside sandbag walls or earth traverses 
2ft. Gins, tfiick between shuttering which must entirely cover the window opening and 
which must touch the brickwork with an overlap of at least 12ins. all round. Protection 
cannot be given by fixing wooden shutters of practicable thickness on the outside of the 
window frame owing to the fact that the pressure pulse due to blast is conveyed through 
wood shutters to the air behind them, which, being compressed, will shatter the glass.
If sandbag walling covering the window on the outside cannot be used, some provision 
must be made to block up the window opening in the event of the window panes being 
fractured or driven in, as the poison laden air must be kept out of the building. For 
this purpose, it is recommended that a frame (either of iron or wood, but preferably the 
former because it will not lose its shape) should be kept handy which will fit accurately 
on the inside of the window, the inner surface of this frame being pressed against the 
window frame by means of thumbscrews fixed at suitable intervals. Between the movable 
frame and the window frame a rubber or felt strip would help to make the joint air-tight.
In this movable frame are fixed two layers of blanket material reinforced with strong 
wire netting (iin. mesh) on each side. If, therefore, the existing window is punctured, 
the blanket window could be quickly placed in position to keep out gas.
In cases where there are difficulties in providing the spare blanket window, it is 
recommended that an old piece of carpet should be nailed to the inside of the window 
frame instead.
I t will be noted that these last suggestions will not prevent the gas entering if an 
explosion nearby again occurs, as the blanket frames will simply be blown en bloc into 
the room.
DOORS.
A blanket or covering of one of the suggested materials should also be fastened 
over the outside of the door-frame, leaving a flap which can be turned up to allow entrance.
If there is a large crevice under the door, a thin strip of wood should be nailed to the 
floor to form a small step against which the door will fit tightly. Even the keyhole 
should be stopped up. In many houses it will be found that the windows and doors 
are so ill-fitting that it is necessary to paste newspaper over the entire surface to render 
them air-tight. A mush of newspapers and water is useful for stopping up large cracks.
FLOORS, WALLS AND CEILINGS.
All cracks should be filled in, or pasted over with paper, unless it is certain that no 
gas can leak through.
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FIREPLACES.
The chimneys of fireplaces should he stuffed up with paper or rags to prevent draught.
Any cracks in the fireplace through which a draught may come should also he sealed. 
PIPES, BASINS, ETC.
Any waste pipes or overflow pipes leading to the outside should be plugged, and 
also any other hole of any kind through which draughts might penetrate. 
VENTILATORS.
All ventilators, in the room or below the floor, should be stopped up. It is important 
that every vent or grating in the building through which air might be drawn to the shelter 
should be blocked.
The measures of gas protection which are described above may be possible only in 
the particular room which is to be occupied as a shelter, but it is very desirable to try 
to keep gas out of the whole house or building. This can be achieved to a great extent 
by seeing that there are no obvious means for gas to enter (broken panes of glass, open 
ventilators, etc.), and then keeping all doors and windows shut during a raid.
The more successfully the whole building is kept free of gas, the less risk will there 
be of gas penetrating into the gas-protected room.
The above precautions are those officially issued by the Air Raids Precautions Depart­
ment, and in spite of the source from which they originate, the reader will be impressed 
by their generally unsatisfactory nature—they are essentially temporary measures of a 
very frail type, likely to be rendered useless by any untoward occurrence, and certainly 
not those that would inspire confidence and prevent panic.
After repeated discussions with those in authority at the War Office, and considerable 
thought, the writer cannot help but feel that although these precautions are the best 
that can be taken in emergency in those buildings already erected, they are far from 
perfect, and that a systematic construction of gas-proof units as an integral part of both 
new and existing buildings must be undertaken.
The following outline is therefore suggested.
CONSTRUCTION OF NEW BUILDINGS (and for adaptation where possible in existing
buildings).
It is perfectly possible to render an entire house or commercial building incendiary 
bombproof and proof against concussive effects by means of a protective roof over the 
whole top floor and wall thicknesses as previously dealt with. I t  is not, however, so easy 
to render a whole house gas-proof, besides being somewhat unnecessary. The best method 
is the construction of a gas-proof unit within a house protected from incendiary bombs 
from above and shell splinters and concussion from without, by the previously suggested 
construction.
To such a place the occupants could retire in the event of air attacks without rush 
or hurry, without any terror-stricken last-minute attempts to provide safety, and remain 
in comparative comfort and quiet, knowing that, apart from the 1,000 to 1 chance of 
a direct hit, they are safe from gas and fire and mutilating splinters.
The comparison between the absolute calm and safety of such a system and the 
most unsatisfactory and unsafe method of wholesale patching as previously outlined, will 
at once impress the reader.
Such a gas-proof unit is remarkably easy of construction as an integral part of a 
building. The accompanying sheets show the system to be adopted, and will be enlarged 
upon here. As it is possible for an attack to last many hours, the gas-proofed room 
should be in communication with both a source of food supply and sanitary accommoda­
tion. To this end the actual pantry, or food store of the house, is designed to lead off 
the unit, connecting with the kitchen by means of a gas-proofed door as detailed.
Connecting with the unit is a small lavatory, containing an earth closet, of the bucket 
type, basin, towels, etc. This has no outside means of lighting or ventilation as the 
number of possible gas entrances to the unit must be reduced as far as possible.
It would be highly satisfactory if the water supply to this convenience could be 
obtained by means of a tank working on the dribble system to the water supply of the 
kitchen. This would give us a tank constantly filled with fresh water within the unit 
so that in the event of an attack, water for both sanitary and drinking purposes would 
be obtainable without dependance on an outside source of supply (liable to be cut off).
The entrance to the room is obtained by means of a gas-proofed door “ a ” leading 
to an air lock with three blanket traps, “ b,” “ c ” and “ d.” At “ d ” there is a further 
gas-proof door communicating with the gas-proof room proper. At the little partition 
formed by blankets “ b ” and “ c ” a steel bin must be placed, with a basin and tap from 
the water supply in the convenience. In the event of a person entering late, after the 
attack had begun, and having been exposed to the gas and contaminated, he could strip 
in this area, place his clothes in the bin for later destruction or decontamination, wash 
down with soap and water to decontaminate his person, and then enter the room proper. 
This is an essential feature of the unit, and must not be omitted, as it is highly improbable 
that all who will seek shelter will be actually in the house at the time the attack commences.
The room proper must be fully equipped with blankets, sheets, pillows, small stove 
or heater, ambulance equipment, etc. (see Appendix 5), and it is suggested that these 
items remain permanently as the equipment of such a room, so that no last-minute rush 
to provide the necessary requirements could occur.
The walls of the air lock should he tiled if possible, if not, painted with water-glass. 
Lighting for the unit (which must include points in the air lock) is optional as regards 
supply, either a dry battery system or fixed oil lamps being satisfactory.
I t will be realised that such a room will have no really useful purpose in peace time. 
On the other hand, it would cause no trouble, and no inconvenience. At the outbreak 
(or feared outbreak) of hostilities, a brief check of all the requirements could be under­
taken, the shelter prepared to its last details, and all set in order. The occupants of the 
house would from that time onwards be prepared fully and as completely as can possibly 
be forseen against that most demoralising and horrible form of modern warfare—air raids.
I t will be noted that the entire unit is unventilated. I t  is not advised by the Air 
Raids Precautions Department that any outside means of ventilation be adopted, as they 
are extremely liable to damage and destruction, not only rendering them ineffective, but 
exposing the room to leaks. The writer has decided to eliminate any such ventilation 
and provide for a filtration unit in the room itself. Information on such filtration units 
is being prepared by the British Government in conjunction with various private firms, 
and although not at present available, will be put before the public immediately upon 
completion. Such a unit would render a room 12ft. x 12ft. x 10ft. (ht.) available for 
10 people for 12 hours in perfect comfort and safety. (This could be considerably increased, 
however, in case of emergency.)
Without such filtration units, the following rules for area apply :
VENTILATION AND ACCOMMODATION.
Allow 75 square feet of surface area (floor, ceiling and walls) per person. On this 
basis shelters may be occupied for periods up to a maximum of six hours. An allowance 
of 100 square feet of surface area per person would provide for a stay of 12 hours.
For comfort and safety, a minimum of six square feet of floor area per person should 
normally be allowed. Under emergency conditions where overcrowding may occur the 
allowance of floor space must never be reduced below 3 | square feet per person.
These suggestions apply to the domestic building only. For the protection of larger 
areas further investigation is required.
S E C T I O N  T H R O U G H  A H O U S E  U N P R O T E C T E D  B Y  B O M B ’ P R O O F  
R O O F  B U T  H A V I N G  C O M P L E T E  S H E L T E R  U N I T  I N C O R P O R A T E D
Q U A R T E R  S C A L E  D E T A I L S  O F  S H E L T E R  U N I T  
I L L U S T R A T E D  B E L O W
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COMMERCIAL BUILDINGS : PROTECTION OF FACTORIES, WORKSHOPS, 
INDUSTRIAL BUILDINGS, ETC.
In general the protection of these buildings and the occupants may be summarised 
as follows :
Buildings : Protection against fire-risk, incendiary bombs and explosive bombs.
Occupants : Provision of adequate accommodation proofed against gas and 
bombing, either inside or outside the buildings occupied.
Fire risk: In dealing with this matter and with incendiary bombs, the fire risk is 
especially stressed by the British authorities as being one of the utmost gravity.
The following extract is from the Air Raids Precautions Department handbook for 
architects on the protection of factories : “ Fire precautions in factories, important at 
all times, are rendered immensely more important when war risks have to be taken into 
account, for these introduce new factors and call for special precautions which do not 
enter into the problem in peace time.”
Briefly, emergency measures for reducing the fire risk are mainly a matter of intensi­
fying the precautions which ought to be in force at all times, coupled with the introduction 
of an incendiary bomb-proof layer over the entire top floor of the building. This latter 
point is quite essential as the futility of safeguarding buildings from internal fires, whilst 
leaving a possible means of external forces causing fire, will be realised.
Such protective flooring as considered previously for the domestic building will amply 
provide against the incendiary bomb contingency, while more intensive precautions must 
be taken within the building for preventing any possible fire from spreading as the result 
of explosive bomb damage, etc. The following suggestions commend themselves.
GENERAL.
A survey should be made of the more vital parts of the plant to see what can be done 
to afford local protection against damage by blasts and splinters, especially for machinery, 
which is essential to the continued working of the factory. Particular attention should 
be given to steam boilers and to surface pipes of essential water and gas supplies and to 
the switchboards and cables of electricity supplies. The piercing of supply pipes, besides 
causing dislocation to the factory, might involve the flooding of shelters or explosions.
The storage of highly inflammable material, such as petrol or benzine in tanks, 
should receive special consideration. Where this is not already done, plant containing 
inflammable spirit stores should be mounded so as to prevent burning spirit spreading over 
a large area. Where there is a large storage on the top floor of a building, it may be 
an advantage to provide a drainpipe to a sump outside to prevent spirit flowing from 
floor to floor.
The danger from explosive bombs provides a considerably more difficult problem, as 
the present system of factory construction entails the framing of buildings in reinforced 
concrete, with an infilling of light brickwork. Large window surfaces are also the rule 
in the average modern building, and constitute a considerable danger point. Explosive 
bombs would tend to damage the brick infilling to a lesser or greater degree, and shatter 
the glass.
Dealing very briefly: In most cases sandbags will afford the most simple and 
effective means of protection; but, as already indicated, wooden boxes filled with earth 
are an excellent substitute.
Any large area of glass should be protected, by wire netting or otherwise, to prevent 
scattering of glass if it should be shattered by an explosion.
wll®re practicable, duplicates of vital key machinery and special fittings should be 
obtained if not already available, and stored as an additional form of protection. These 
duplicates should preferably not all be stored in one place, and should be awav from the 
main buildings.
leiepfione switchboards and other places essential to communication and control will 
require protection, also any place earmarked for use as a first-aid post or for some other 
air raid precautionary purpose.
Such precautions, and others suited to particular circumstances, are the most that 
can be taken m cases of emergency as regards the buildings themselves. In connection 
however, with providing bomb- and gas-proof accommodation for the occupants who would 
be normally at work therein, a different problem is presented from that of the domestic 
dwelling.
I t is evident that only the with the greatest difficulty could a large factory building 
with all its many points of weakness, be rendered effectively gas-proof; for to be gas-proof 
the building must be air-tight. There is the further danger of the building’s collapse 
due to explosions within or without, which is greater than in the case of a small private 
dwelling. Such collapse would either kill, maim or imprison the occupants if protection 
was provided for them within the building itself.
I t  is therefore advisable that the shelters for the workers be placed at some point 
outside the factory itself, but within easy range so that immediate access could beP had 
m. t-'111® of emergency. I t  is realised, however, that some factories and industrial plants 
might be so constructed as to allow of portions being adapted to suit admirablv for the 
protection of the staff, such as those having well protected basements, long corridors, etc
This would depend on the particular case in point, and a general rule cannot there­
fore he laid down. The suggestions for a shelter which follow, however, could easily he 
adapted to such buildings—hearing in mind the necessary precautions to he taken, viz.:
(a) The walls and roof of the shelter should he of sound construction and should 
he capable of being made gas-proof.
(h) The fewer the openings, such as windows and doors, the better, and the easier 
it will he to afford protection against splinters and gas. In a shelter of any considerable 
size it is desirable that two exits should he prepared.
(c) No shelter should he located below heavy machinery, water tanks, or below any 
structure which might collapse and demolish it, unless the roof is of sufficiently strong 
construction.
(d) No shelter should he near stores of inflammable material. Proximity to boilers 
or to numbers of hot pipes should also be avoided, as high temperatures in a shelter are 
undesirable.
(e) If the shelter has windows it is preferable that they should face another building 
or a wall, or else soft ground, since there will then be less danger from flying splinters 
and blast.
(f) There is also advantage in having shelters on the side of the building not exposed 
to the prevailing wind, which may tend to blow gas through cracks which have not been 
properly sealed.
(g) An internal corridor may form a good shelter if it can be closed at both ends 
for protection against gas.
(h) If  underground accommodation is available and suitable, additional supports 
may have to be inserted to ensure that the roof would not collapse if the structure above 
were wrecked. Particular attention should be paid to the means of exit in case of any 
such damage occurring, and extra supports are strongly advised round the doors to prevent 
the exits becoming blocked. I t  is for this reason that any accommodation of this kind 
should, if possible, have alternative exits.
PROTECTION OF OCCUPANTS.
In general, collective protection may be provided in any of the following ways:—
(1) By the use as shelters of suitable accommodation in existing buildings;
(2) By trenches or other outside shelters;
(3) By galleries (of the type used in mines) where these exist already or where 
they can be constructed Tnore easily than special shelters or trenches;
(4) By dispersal;
(5) By a combination of any of the above.
For the purposes of an architectural thesis, it is only necessary to deal with (1). 
(2) and (3) have, however, been briefly dealt with in Appendix 6, for general interest 
reasons, although falling outside the scope of the present investigation.
EXTERNAL SHELTERS FOR FACTORIES.
These shelters are based on the plan adopted for the domestic building, having, how­
ever, a much greater scope. I t  has been the aim of the writer to curtail as far as possible 
any unnecessary expenditure which would render the construction of such shelters prohibi­
tive in cost, while embracing every detail necessary for the complete protection of 
employees. (Estimates as to the cost have been gone into in Appendix 7.)
W ID IN C i  - EMERGENCY UM  ONLY- PEBTPCCTIYC SKETCH — NOT TO SCALE
7I
e l e v a t i o n  of  s h e l t e r  u s e d  as  p e a c e t i m e  r e s t r o o m  f o r  s t a f f
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The accompanying illustration gives a suggested, standard form of shelter which is 
a completely self-contained unit, the construction being as follows :
The actual shelter room itself is 30ft. x 40ft. x l i f t ,  in height, seating and resting 
accommodation for the occupants being provided. The walls are of 12in. concrete rein­
forced with Jin. dia. bars at 9in. centres vertically, with Jin. spacing bars at 18in. centres 
horizontally on both sides of the wall, the front and back reinforcement being held 
together with rectangular links of Jin. dia. bars at 12in. centres. This construction has been 
tested successfully by the Air Raids Precautions Department to give complete protection 
against 5001b. explosive bombs falling not less than 50ft. away. The roof construction 
is as previously designed for domestic protection against light bombs of the incendiary 
type, with the necessary steel beams and stanchions to support the greater span. The 
floor and foundations are of normal reinforced concrete.
There are three entrances/exits to the shelter, one set being reserved for emer­
gency only, one for normal access during gas attacks and one arranged so as to allow 
of hurried access without passing through the air lock and change rooms in the event of a 
bombing attack being unaccompanied by gas.
It will be noted that the majority of persons entering the unit even during a gas 
raid will have had at least five minutes’ warning and will be able to enter before the 
“ non-gas ” entrance is closed. Only a small proportion of late-comers will need to use 
the air lock.
The air lock for normal access in case of gas bombing is composed of an air-tight and 
bomb-proof entrance door guarded by a wall and revetment against damage by explosions. 
I t  leads directly to two curtained sub-divisions for trapping gas admitted when the door 
is opened. From this sub-division access is gained to the changing rooms, where con­
taminated persons strip their clothes, placing them in the compartments provided, for 
later decontamination or destruction, and passing on to the cleansing rooms. If they are 
gassed or injured, they go, after cleansing, to the first-aid room. (If only explosive bombs 
are being used, the entrance is gained through the “ non-gas ” passage, and injured have 
immediate access to the first-aid rooms as they are uncontaminated. In cases of gas, the 
injured must not be admitted to first-aid treatment till they have been stripped, cleansed 
and decontaminated. It will be noted that the planning of the entrances has been arranged 
to automatically assure this.)
After cleansing the person with soap and water, fresh uncontaminated clothes are 
put on and the entrant has immediate access to the shelter-room proper.
I t  will be noted that once the air-tight doors over the “ non-gas ” entrances have been 
closed, no gas can directly enter the unit. Gas which is admitted into the first sub­
division of the air lock after entering only partially contaminates the air. Gas cannot 
pass through the curtain trap which divides this compartment from the stripping-room, 
and only a small portion of dilute gas enters with the persons raising the curtain; this 
gas is proportionately diluted by the large volume of air in the stripping room, and 
becomes extremely weak. If any of this weak gas is admitted to the cleansing room 
by parties raising the curtain trap between stripping and cleansing-rooms, it is so dilute 
as to be ineffective. None will be admitted from there to either the first-aid room or the 
dressing room. Consequently no gas can enter the actual shelter room. Explosions outside 
cannot blow the curtains out of place as the air-tight doors at the entrances of the shelter 
are rendered bomb-proof as for the domestic dwellings (see drawings). For decontamina­
tion reasons (to be gone into later) it is essential that the whole of the air lock, changing 
room, contaminated clothes room, cleansing and dressing room be tiled throughout, ceiling, 
walls and floor. Gas curtains are, in addition, fitted to all door openings, without excep­
tion, as an added protective precaution. Earth closets, wash-hand basins and urinals are 
provided off the main shelter room, and the room itself is equipped with all the necessary 
requirements as outlined in Appendix 3.
This unit is designed to contain 250 occupants (without outside ventilation) for six 
hours, with an emergency maximum time limit of 12 hours. I t  is the largest advisable 
size, as although it provides adequate protection from incendiary bomb direct hits, gas, and 
distant explosive bomb hits, it cannot give protection against the direct hits of the larger 
calibre bombs and aerial torpedoes. I t  is therefore not desirable to have more than 250 
persons collected in one place, where a direct hit would cause a considerable number of 
casualties. Should the staff be greater, the number of shelters must be increased to accom­
modate them all, either on the same or a similar scale of planning.
Owing to the clinging nature of many of the present war gases, and their heaviness, 
it is not desirable to sink these shelters below ground level, although greater protection 
against bomb splinters would thereby be gained. The shelter designed, therefore, has 
been placed nearly at ground level, with revetments protecting the entrances and exits. 
The drainage from the sanitary accommodation (urinals, water drainage to cleansing 
room, etc.) must be led directly downwards to a soak-away so as to prevent any danger 
of bomb craters near the building admitting gas through the drainage pipes.
Further advisable precautions are :
1. See that the ground in the vicinity of the shelter is kept well ploughed or turned
2. Soil may be piled up against the side of the shelter, but kept well clear of the 
entrance.
3. Access to the shelter should be kept absolutely clear at all times, to allow of 
immediate entrance.
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I t is suggested that during peace-time the shelter could he used as a rest-house and 
recreation room for the staff. This idea has much to commend itself, as the occupants 
would become acquainted with the premises, and this would mediate against panic in 
time of attack, besides providing a useful peace-time purpose for the structure.
The foregoing completes the investigation of this section of the subject for the pur­
poses of the thesis. The writer is only too aware that he has been unable to do more 
than touch on the fringe of an intensely difficult, complicated and urgent problem. It 
has proved hard to obtain accurate information on the subject, even with the whole-hearted 
co-operation of numerous people, owing to lack of knowledge on the matter. The actual 
constructional details are therefore entirely theoretical, but are based on the known 
results of experiments made by the Air Raids Precautions Department, Whitehall. The 
British Government is at the moment investigating this problem of integral constructional 
protection, and intends putting the results into a handbook of information for its defence 
officials, architects and others concerned.
The writer, however, chose the subject in spite of its difficulty because of its extremely 
practical nature, coupled with the fact that he felt nothing was being done in the matter 
in this country. With the information placed at his disposal, he has earnestly endeavoured 
to present a logical, practicable and efficient scheme for gas and bomb protection for 
innocent non-combatants. The men, women and children who are needing it so badly in 
Spain, Abyssinia and China to-day, may need it even more desperately in South Africa 
to-morrow.
APPENDIX No. 1.
In addition to the masks manufactured by the British Government, the following 
firms undertake their private production: —
Avon India Rubber Co.,
J. E. Baxter and Co.,
Greengate Irwin,
D. Moosley, Ltd.,
Siebe Gorman,
North British Rubber Co.,
India Rubber and Guttapercha Co.,
Leyland,
Lancashire Rubber Co.
None of these firms can guarantee their masks after a period of six months. They 
cannot guarantee them effective against any of the late gases produced by various foreign 
countries.
APPENDIX No. 2.
Gases, likely to be met with in war, against which the respirator offers no protection:—
1. Prussic Acid Gas.
2. Sulphuretted Hydrogen.
3. Carbon Monoxide—Respiratory poison.
4. Nitrous fumes—Respiratory irritant.
5. Arseniuretted Hydrogen.
6. Trinitrotoluene.
7. Phospherous Oxides.
8. Vincintite.
9. Dichlorodiethyl Sulphide.
10. Chlorovinylchloroarsine.
APPENDIX No. 3.
Considering whether the suggestion for incendiary bomb-proofing falls within the 
bounds of practical possibility for the average building, the cost per super yard of the 
construction would approximate :
6" slab, 1 super yard @ 7/-
3" „ „ „ „ @ 4/-
3 ,, ,, ,, ,, @ 4/-
12" of earth, one super yard at 2/- 
8" granulated asbestos, 1 super yard at 7/- 
Steel reinforcement to 6" slab, say 6/- per super yard 
„ „ „ 3" slabs, say 2/- per super yard each
Tight casing to the above, 1 super yard at 6/- 
Plastering to ceiling, 1 sq. yard at 2/6
A total of £1 17s. 6d. per super yard,
That is to say, to adequately protect an 18ft. x 18ft. room against incendiary bomb 
direct hits, would entail an additional outlay of approximately £68.
To protect an entire house of average size, say 60ft. x 60ft. (outside dimensions), 
would cost approximately £750, less the cost of the normal roof and ceiling it would 
replace—say £750 less £400, that is an additional outlay of £350.
This sum, so far, at any rate, is only too plainly within the hounds of the average 
householder’s purse, considering the serious nature of the danger, and the protection 
afforded.
APPENDIX No. 4.
GASES POSSIBLY TO BE MET WITH UNDER LOCAL CONDITIONS.
COAL GAS-PRODUCTS :
Trinitrotoleune: From which is derived Brombenzyl Cyanide.
Nitrohenzen: From which is derived Dipenylchlorarsine.
SALT GAS-PRODUCTS :
Phosgene: From the basic derivation of which, in conjunction with Chloracetic acid, 
the gas Chloroaceot-phenone is formed.
CYANOGEN CHLORIDE :
OTHER GASES:
Prussic Acid Gas.
Sulphuretted Hydrogen.
Carbon Monoxide—Respiratory poison.
Nitrous fumes—Respiratory irritant.
Arseniuretted Hydrogen.
Trinitrotoluene.
Phosphorus Oxides.
Vincintite.
Dichlorodiethyl Sulphide.
Chlorovinylchloroarsine.
Chlorine.
Chloro picrin.
Phosgene.
Lewisite.
APPENDIX No. 5.
EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR AIR RAID UNITS.
1. A list of those who ought to use the shelter, so that a roll call can be made.
2. Tables and chairs of benches.
3. Blankets, or other warm coverings.
4. Plates, cups, knives, forks, etc.
5. Means of occupying the time without exertion (books, playing cards, etc.).
6. Emergency lightning arrangements (emergency lighting or candles and matches 
or electric torches or hurricane lamps and matches).
7. Basins for washing and soap and towels (in lavatory).
8. First-aid outfit.
9. Emergency means of rendering air lock gas-proof again, if gas-proofing should 
be destroyed.
FIRST-AID :
1 triangular bandage, unbleached calico, B.P.C., 38in. x 54in., wrapped.
1 white open wove bandage, B.P.C., lin. x 3 yds., wrapped.
1 white open wove bandage, B.P.C., 2in. x 4 yds., wrapped.
1 ioz. plain lint, B.P.C., wrapped and cartoned.
1 Joz. absorbent cotton wool, B.P.C., interleaved, wrapped and cartoned.
1 pair surgical scissors, 5in.
6 safety pins, nickel plated on brass, in metal container, size 3.
3 30 minim ampoules, 2 per cent, alcholic solution of iodine, in card containers 
1 2oz. stoppered bottle of sal volatile, in metal case.
1 2oz. graduated medicine tumbler, in strong container.
1 piece strong cane, 6in. long.
Elastic plaster dressings, assorted sizes, for minor injuries.
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CONSTRUCTION OP TRENCHES.
Trenches should he 7ft. deep and passage-ways should he 2ft. wide. The parts of 
a covered trench used as shelters should he wider than 2ft.—the exact width depending 
on the form of shelter to he provided.
The trench should he revetted. One method is to use wooden frames with hoarding, 
corrugated iron or any other suitable material behind. Where boarding is used, the 
following notes apply to the passage-ways:—The excavated width of passage-ways should 
be 2ft. loins, and revetting should be done with inch boarding with lin. by 2in. uprights. 
The uprights should be driven 1ft. 6ins. into the ground, and held apart at the head by 
4in. by 2in. spreaders. This gives a clear width of 2ft.
The trench should be rendered as weather-proof and gas-proof as possible; this could 
be done by covering with 2ft. of earth. If  rubble is available, a layer of 9ins. or 12ins. 
of rubbish should be placed on top of the earth. The earth should be supported on 
corrugated iron, resting on 6ins. by 3in. rafters at 1ft. 6in. intervals, fitted on 6in. by 12in. 
wall plates.
Trench system should have at least two entrances. An air lock should be provided 
in the passage-way at each entrance. This may take the form of two gas curtains, with 
a shelf at the side of the trench on which the curtain is placed when not in use. The 
gas curtains should be at least 4ft. apart, and preferably anything up to 10ft. apart in a 
communal shelter.
Covered trenches may be provided either with seats in recesses cut off the passage 
trench or with bunks in chambers cut off the passage trench.
(a) Seats in recesses for ten persons.
A recess 15ft. long and 1ft. 6ins. wide will accommodate 10 persons. The seat should 
be 1ft. 3ins. wide. The recesses should be dug on each side of the passage trench 
alternately.
(b) Bunks in chamber for six persons.
The inside measurements of the chamber should be 6ft. 6ins. by 4ft. 6ins. by 6ft. 9ins. 
deep. It should be revetted by 1 llin . boarding or other suitable material held in position 
by the uprights of the bunking. Bunking for six persons made of 3in. by 3in. timber, 
3in. by lin. wood fillets and expanded metal sheets, giving each bunk 6ft. 6ins. length and 
2ft. clear width.
A PPEN D IX  No. 6.
CONSTRUCTION OF GALLERIES.
Provided there is sufficient earth overhead, galleries afford very good protection for 
personnel during air raids. Galleries with chambers off them are recommended instead 
of the continuous tunnel type. The continuous tunnel does not provide for any localisation 
of burst, and this is essential if the protection is only splinter-proof. The localisation 
of burst is best arranged by a travel gallery with chambers off, the travel gallery being 
a passage, along which people travel to reach the chambers. The size of the gallery 
need not be large (if it is, people will tend to stay in it instead of the chambers), but 
it should have plenty of entrances.
For the travel gallery, a width of 2ft. 9ins. and height of 6ft. 4ins. should be enough. 
The chamber should be 8ft. wide (including the width of the gallery) and 13ft. 6ins. long. 
Entrances to the system should be about about every 100ft. or to suit exits from the 
buildings. The entrances should be 5ft. wide.
The frames, or setts as they are called, for lining galleries, may be made of various 
materials. Wood setts have been largely used, but a steel frame is recommended. It 
is simple, inexpensive and very effective. One of the advantages of these steel frames 
for galleries is the simplicity of erection. Steel frames are made in two parts, each part 
consisting of vertical sides with the tops sloping upwards to the centre of the arch; the 
two parts can be locked together along the top of the arch. If lock sheeting is used, 
it should be 6ft. 6ins. by 3ft. for galleries and 8ft. loins, by 9ft. for chambers. The width 
of the sheets is 1ft. 6ins. They are fixed at the top of the arch by a steel clip and 
wedge.
In undertakings where large slag heaps or waste dumps are formed, as at coal mines, 
tin mines, etc., shelter galleries can easily be formed by erecting these steel frames at 
ground level on the site of a proposed slag head or dumping ground for waste, and in time 
they will be covered by a considerable thickness of slag, etc.
If tunelling is resorted to and lock sheets are used, the excavation has to be well on 
in front before the sheet can be positioned owing to the arching of the sheets; therefore 
the earth must stand up well. The hole excavated to take the sheets must be about 1ft. 
larger than the size of the sheeting and, after fixing the sheets, must be packed behind. 
If this is not done, great difficulty will be experienced in fitting, and there will be gaps 
above the sheeting between projections.
a p p e n d i x  no . 7.
CONSIDERING VERY BRIEFLY THE APPROXIMATE COST OF A COMMERCIAL
SHELTER AS ILLUSTRATED.
CONCRETE:
4:2:1 cement concrete on tight casing packed round reinforcement :
12" walling ...
6" walling ...
6" concrete floor 
6" roof slak 
3" roof slab 
Foundations
3,710 sq. ft. 
1,480 sq. ft.
2.080 sq. ft.
2.080 sq. ft. 
1,040 sq. ft. 
2,000 sq. ft.
12,390 sq. ft., i.e., 4.130 cu. ft.
460 cubic yds. @ 4 0 /- .......................... ........................ .
Reinforcement, including R.S.J.’s Item .............. 7
Tiling to all internal walls: 188 sq. yds. @ 23/-
Silicate of soda application to aU external concrete surfaces : 222 sup. yds.
@ 2/6 per yd. ................................................................................
5 bomb- and gas-proof doors @ £12
22 gas-proof curtain traps @ £1 .....................................
Builders’ sand for roof. Item
8" granulated asbestos: 70 sq. yds. @ £2 5s. Od. per sq. yd. 7 7  7  7777.7 77777
First-aid equipment. Item ...........................................................
8 windows with gas and bomb-proof covers- 8 @ £5 
Equipment of rooms and E.C.’s
10 per cent, for unconsidered extras 
Say an approximate total
£920 0 0
1,000 0 0
404 4 0
27 15 0
60 0 0
22 0 0
10 0 0
157 10 0
250 0 0
40 0 0
250 0 0
£3,141 9 0
321 6 8
£3,500 0 0
As the shelter accommodates in perfect safety 250 persons, the average cost per 
occupant would be about £15 Os. Od.
APPENDIX No. 8.
GLOSSARY OF TECHNICAL TERMS.
Air Lock : A compartment or lobby at the entrance to a gas protected room or shelter 
which enables persons to pass in and out without admitting gas.
Bleaching Powder : Chloride of lime.
Concentration : The proportion of gas in a given volume of air.
Contamination : The liquid or vapour remaining on an object or person as a result of 
exposure to gas (usually a persistent gas).
Decontamination : A process intended to remove the contaminating gas or to render it 
harmless.
Gas : Includes any chemical substance, solid, liquid or gas, used in war for its poisonous 
or irritant effects on the human body.
Non-persistent gas : A gas which forms a cloud (not necessarily visible) immediately it 
is released and leaves no liquid contamination on the ground.
Persistent gas : A gas in liquid form which evaporates slowly and so continues to give 
off dangerous vapour for a long period.
Respirator : An apparatus designed to protect the eyes and lungs from gas.
THIS THESIS WILL BE CONCLUDED IN THE FOLLOWING ISSUE.
THE NATAL PROVINCIAL INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS 
ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING
Minutes of the Eleventh Annual General Meeting- of Members held in 
the Institute’s Room, No. 5, Poynton’s Chambers, Smith Street, Durban, at 
4 p.m., Friday, 11th March, 1938.
PRESENT.
Messrs. B. V. Bartholomew (President), D. C. McDonald (Vice-President), 
E. M. Powers, W. S. Payne, L. A. Peyton, A. G. Frolich, Col. G. T. Hurst, 
R. G. Stead, F. W. Powers, E. S. Powers, Wallace Paton, C. S. M. Taylor, 
R. C. Bennett, G. E. Le Sueur, R. P. Hamlin, W. Hirst, I. Park-Ross, J. C. 
Simpson, W. J. Gunn and T. H. Chaplin, Secretary. The President, Mr. B. V. 
Bartholomew, occupied the chair.
Apologies for absence were received from Mr. H. E. Chick and Mr. M. 
Poole.
NOTICE CONVENING MEETING.
The notice convening the meeting was taken as read, and the Chairman 
declared the Eleventh Annual General Meeting duly constituted.
MINUTES.
The minutes of the Tenth Annual General Meeting held on 12th March, 
1937, having been circulated to all members, were, on the motion of the Chair­
man, taken as read, confirmed, and signed by the Chairman.
The Chairman, in welcoming the members, and particularly the new 
members, whom he wished every success in their future career, expressed his 
pleasure at seeing so fine an attendance, and in a brief address said that 
beyond the matters dealt with in the Committee’s annual report, there was 
little to add. He urged members to be loyal to one another by adhering to 
the scale of fees as laid down in the Act. He was afraid there was a decided 
tendency on the part of some to ignore the tariff by devious ways suspected 
by the Committee, to the detriment of other practitioners who were more 
honourable.
The Committee had discussed this matter and reported upon definite 
cases of subversion which are known, and it is seeking evidence in order to 
effectively deal with the situation and members of this Institute. Concrete 
evidence in this direction is welcomed by the Committee.
Instances have been reported where financial agents and prospective 
clients have subverted or endeavoured to subvert members of this Institute 
from adhering to the tariff, with the result that those architects were being- 
controlled by financial agents. A tendency towards and a land slide in this 
direction would be a catastrophe, and he appealed to members to be loyal and 
maintain the tariff at all costs.
The Chairman, in thanking the members for the honour of being their 
President for the past year, expressed his thanks to his colleagues on the 
Committee for their great assistance and loyal support during his term of 
office, and also thanked the Secretary, on behalf of the Committee, for the 
efficient manner in which he had carried out his duties.
ANNUAL REPORT AND BALANCE SHEET.
The annual report and balance sheet, a copy of which had been circulated 
to members, were, on the motion of the Chairman, taken as read and laid on 
the table for discussion.
In moving- the adoption of the annual report and balance sheet, the 
Chairman said that the members would appreciate this Institute’s sound 
financial position.
The motion, being seconded, was carried unanimously.
APPOINTMENT OF AUDITOR.
Mr. J. E. Duff, F.S.A.A., was re-appointed auditor for the ensuing year. 
NATAL ARCHITECTURE MEDAL.
The Chairman advised the meeting that, in compliance with the Conditions 
of Competition for the Natal Architecture Medal for the year 1937, the Jury, 
after careful examination of all the buildings which were nominated for the 
honour, have given their award in favour of Grosvenor Court Flats, Marine 
Parade, Durban, the architects responsible for the successful design being 
Messrs. Kallenbach, Kennedy & Furner, A.R.I.B.A., Johannesburg and 
Durban. The Chairman much regretted that, as no representative of the 
successful architects was present, the presentation of the medal could not be 
made at the present meeting. It was accordingly proposed, seconded and 
unanimously resolved that the medal be awarded to the firm’s head office, 
J ohannesburg.
ELECTION OF NEW COMMITTEE.
The Chairman declared the ballot for the new Committee closed, and the 
ballot papers haying been dealt with in accordance with the regulations, the 
scrutineers appointed by the meeting retired to count the votes.
The result of the ballot was handed to the Chairman, who thereupon 
announced the following nine members duly elected on the new Committee for 
the ensuing year:—
Messrs. B. V. Bartholomew, Wallace Paton, E. M. Powers Col G T 
Hu,rlt; D„ C; McDonald, C. S. M. Taylor, W. S. Payne, W. Hirst (Practising) 
and Mr. Melville Poole (Salaried).
UNDER GENERAL.
Natal Architecture Medal—1938.
Mj-D. C. McDonald suggested that the conditions governingthe adjudica­
tion of buildings for the Architecture Medal award be revised, as he thought 
that the present system of adjudication could be improved upon
After some discussion, it was resolved that this item be left to the incoming 
Committee to consider and thereafter could be discussed by members at a 
quarterly meeting. J
Work by Unqualified Persons.
A general discussion ensued regarding architectural work being carried 
out by unqualified persons.
Mr. Ernest M. Powers (President-in-Chief) explained that the Committee 
had given a great deal of attention to this matter, and had considered in 
conference with the City Council the question of a new by-law to the effect 
that all building plans for work of a value exceeding £750 shall be prepared 
and signed by a registered architect,” but the by-law, on being submitted to 
the Provincial Council, had been turned down.
w r' Hamlin suggested that some sort of propaganda be instituted so as 
to bring the profession and the duties of the architect before the general 
public. It was eventually agreed that this matter be placed on the agenda 
for discussion by members at a quarterly meeting.
ARCHITECTURE CLASSES.
At the instance of Mr. F. W. Powers, it was agreed that a circular letter 
be addressed to those firms employing students, to allow the students off-time 
Durban0* 06 h°UrS t0 attend the lectures given at the Natal University College,
MEETING CLOSED.
On the Chairman declaring the business of the meeting completed, a 
hearty vote of thanks was accorded him for his successful term of office. 
The meeting terminated at 5.50 p.m.
COMMITTEE, 1938-1939.
Messrs. B. V. Bartholomew, A.R.I.B.A., President; D. C. McDonald 
A.R.I.B.A., Vice-President; Wallace Paton, F.R.I.B.A.; Ernest M. Powers 
F.R.I.B.A.; Col. G. T. Hurst, F.R.I.B.A.; W. S. Payne, A.R.I.B.A.; C. S. M. 
Taylor, A.R.I.B.A.; W. Hirst, A.R.I.B.A.; Melville Poole, A.R.I.B.A. 
(Salaried).
REPRESENTATIVE ON CENTRAL COUNCIL.
Mr. B. V. Bartholomew, A.R.I.B.A.
A l t p r i i  o f o
Mr. D. C, McDonald, A.R.I.B.A.
P R O F E S S I O N A L  N O T E S  A N D  N E W S
The following notice is published for the information of members:— 
BUILDERS’ TEMPORARY CLOSETS.
Notice is hereby given that temporary builders’ closets for use in connec­
tion with all building operations, within a sewered area, commenced after 
the 31st May, 1938, must be connected to the sewer.
Any further information may be obtained from Room 95, Municipal 
Offices, City Hall.
Mr. B. S. Cooke, Dipl. Arch. (Rand) has removed his offices to 907, 
Winchester House, Loveday Street, Telephone 33-8828.
O B I T U A R Y
A N D R E W  A L L E N
We regret to record the death of Mr. Andrew Allen, who for many years 
was closely associated with the town planning movement in the Transvaal.
Mr. Allen was born at Ballymena, Ireland, in 1868, and came to South 
Africa some forty years ago. He opened a business known as Allen’s 
Asphalt Company in Capetown, and was one of the first to consider the 
possibility of opening tin mines at Kuils River. About ten years ago he 
moved to Johannesburg, where the founded the Asphalt Manufacturing 
Company, of which he was the proprietor. He took an active interest in 
all plans for the improvement of Capetown, and was one of the first to recom­
mend a foreshore improvement scheme when the subject arose about ten 
years ago. This scheme created considerable interest and was published 
some years ago in this journal.
He was President of the Transvaal Town Planning Association and 
prepared schemes for the improvement of the railway area in Johannesburg 
and the beach at Durban. During his residence in Capetown he was 
President of the Irish Association and later became President of the same 
Association in Johannesburg. He was also a well-known Rotarian.
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